Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains

Name: Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains
Author: Baarslag, T., Gerding, E. H., Aydoğan, Reyhan, Schraefel, M. C.

İsim	Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains
Yazar	Baarslag, T., Gerding, E. H., Aydoğan, Reyhan, Schraefel, M. C.
Basım Tarihi:	2015
Basım Yeri	- IEEE
Konu	Uncertainty, Electronic mail, Planning, Force, Cost function, Games, Intelligent agents
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	978-1-4673-9618-9
Kayıt Numarası	57972f7d-f6f9-4de1-8df1-d7f9e362f05e
Lokasyon	Computer Science
Tarih	2015
Notlar	EPSRC ; ITEA
Örnek Metin	The last two decades have seen a growing interest in automated agents that are able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators in a wide variety of negotiation domains. One key aspect of a successful negotiating agent is its ability to make appropriate concessions at the right time, especially when there are costs associated with the duration of the negotiation. However, so far, there is no fundamental approach on how much to concede at every stage of the negotiation in such time-sensitive domains. We introduce an efficient solution based on simultaneous search, which is able to select the optimal sequence of offers that maximizes expected payoff, given the agent's beliefs about the opponent. To this end, we show that our approach is consistent with known theoretical results and we demonstrate both its effectiveness and natural properties by applying it to a number of typical negotiation scenarios. Finally, we show in a number of experiments that our solution outperforms other state of the art strategy benchmarks.
DOI	10.1109/WI-IAT.2015.161

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains

Yazar Baarslag, T., Gerding, E. H., Aydoğan, Reyhan, Schraefel, M. C.

Basım Tarihi 2015

Basım Yeri - IEEE

Konu Uncertainty, Electronic mail, Planning, Force, Cost function, Games, Intelligent agents

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 978-1-4673-9618-9

Kayıt Numarası 57972f7d-f6f9-4de1-8df1-d7f9e362f05e

Lokasyon Computer Science

Tarih 2015

Notlar EPSRC ; ITEA

Örnek Metin The last two decades have seen a growing interest in automated agents that are able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators in a wide variety of negotiation domains. One key aspect of a successful negotiating agent is its ability to make appropriate concessions at the right time, especially when there are costs associated with the duration of the negotiation. However, so far, there is no fundamental approach on how much to concede at every stage of the negotiation in such time-sensitive domains. We introduce an efficient solution based on simultaneous search, which is able to select the optimal sequence of offers that maximizes expected payoff, given the agent's beliefs about the opponent. To this end, we show that our approach is consistent with known theoretical results and we demonstrate both its effectiveness and natural properties by applying it to a number of typical negotiation scenarios. Finally, we show in a number of experiments that our solution outperforms other state of the art strategy benchmarks.

DOI 10.1109/WI-IAT.2015.161