Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Name: Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Author: Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat

İsim	Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Yazar	Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat
Basım Tarihi:	2013
Basım Yeri	- IEEE
Konu	Spectrum trading, Cognitive radio networks, Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism, Channel allocation, Truthtelling
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1536-1276
Kayıt Numarası	cc56ec29-bcc3-4daf-85ec-aed06926184d
Lokasyon	Electrical & Electronics Engineering
Tarih	2013
Notlar	TÜBA
Örnek Metin	In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for exclusive usage spectrum access model in cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function which depends on channel capacity, delay sensitive and delay-insensitive data traffics of secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism for non-identical channel allocation among r-minded bidders in two different cases. In the first case, the SUs are r-minded but they can submit bid only for single channels. In the second case, the SUs are r-minded and they can submit bid for bundles of channels. We show that the first case is solvable in polynomial time but in the other one, the problem of determining auction outcomes is NP-hard. We propose two sub-optimal methods for solving this problem, namely greedy algorithm and randomized rounding linear programming (LP) relaxation algorithm. Due to the sub-optimal nature of solutions in the second case, VCG mechanism is not truthful anymore and the SUs can lie to maximize their utilities. To address this, we propose an auction mechanism with limited truthfulness property based on an iterative greedy algorithm.
DOI	10.1109/TWC.2013.090313.121841

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Yazar Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat

Basım Tarihi 2013

Basım Yeri - IEEE

Konu Spectrum trading, Cognitive radio networks, Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism, Channel allocation, Truthtelling

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1536-1276

Kayıt Numarası cc56ec29-bcc3-4daf-85ec-aed06926184d

Lokasyon Electrical & Electronics Engineering

Tarih 2013

Notlar TÜBA

Örnek Metin In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for exclusive usage spectrum access model in cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function which depends on channel capacity, delay sensitive and delay-insensitive data traffics of secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism for non-identical channel allocation among r-minded bidders in two different cases. In the first case, the SUs are r-minded but they can submit bid only for single channels. In the second case, the SUs are r-minded and they can submit bid for bundles of channels. We show that the first case is solvable in polynomial time but in the other one, the problem of determining auction outcomes is NP-hard. We propose two sub-optimal methods for solving this problem, namely greedy algorithm and randomized rounding linear programming (LP) relaxation algorithm. Due to the sub-optimal nature of solutions in the second case, VCG mechanism is not truthful anymore and the SUs can lie to maximize their utilities. To address this, we propose an auction mechanism with limited truthfulness property based on an iterative greedy algorithm.

DOI 10.1109/TWC.2013.090313.121841