Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias

Name: Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias
Author: Şensoy, Murat

İsim	Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias
Yazar	Şensoy, Murat
Basım Tarihi:	2014
Konu	Multi agent systems
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1613-0073
Kayıt Numarası	25ded93a-66b0-4570-a741-a44847d092ea
Lokasyon	Computer Science
Tarih	2014
Notlar	U.S. Army Research Laboratory ; TÜBİTAK
Örnek Metin	Stereotypes may influence the attitudes that individuals have towards others. Stereotypes, therefore, represent biases toward and against others. In this paper, we formalise stereotypical bias within trust evaluations. Then, using the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, we quantitatively analyse how cooperation and mutual trust between self-interested agents are affected by stereotypical bias. We present two key findings: i) stereotypical bias of one player may inhibit cooperation by creating incentives for others to defect, ii) even if only one of the players has a stereotypical bias, convergence of mutual trust between players may be strictly determined by the bias.
Editör	Cohen, R., Falcone, R., Norman, T.
Cilt	1740

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias

Yazar Şensoy, Murat

Basım Tarihi 2014

Konu Multi agent systems

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1613-0073

Kayıt Numarası 25ded93a-66b0-4570-a741-a44847d092ea

Lokasyon Computer Science

Tarih 2014

Notlar U.S. Army Research Laboratory ; TÜBİTAK

Örnek Metin Stereotypes may influence the attitudes that individuals have towards others. Stereotypes, therefore, represent biases toward and against others. In this paper, we formalise stereotypical bias within trust evaluations. Then, using the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, we quantitatively analyse how cooperation and mutual trust between self-interested agents are affected by stereotypical bias. We present two key findings: i) stereotypical bias of one player may inhibit cooperation by creating incentives for others to defect, ii) even if only one of the players has a stereotypical bias, convergence of mutual trust between players may be strictly determined by the bias.

Editör Cohen, R., Falcone, R., Norman, T.

Cilt 1740