On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures

Name: On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Author: Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.

İsim	On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Yazar	Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.
Basım Tarihi:	2020
Basım Yeri	- Springer
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	978-303059266-0
Kayıt Numarası	041acb3a-5201-4a3a-9947-7c2721d08cc8
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2020
Örnek Metin	In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication, coordination or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. We study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
Editör	Chen, J., Feng, Q., Xu, J.
DOI	10.1007/978-3-030-59267-7_23
Cilt	12337

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Aramaya Dön

Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures

Yazar Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.

Basım Tarihi 2020

Basım Yeri - Springer

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 978-303059266-0

Kayıt Numarası 041acb3a-5201-4a3a-9947-7c2721d08cc8

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2020

Örnek Metin In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication, coordination or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. We study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.

Editör Chen, J., Feng, Q., Xu, J.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-59267-7_23

Cilt 12337